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Abstract. The Internet of Things (IoT) technology is being widely in-
tegrated in many areas like smart-homes, smart-cities, healthcare, and
critical infrastructures. As shown by some recent incidents, like the Mirai
and BrickerBot botnets, security is a key issue for current and future IoT
systems. In this paper, we examine the security of different categories of
IoT devices to understand their resilience under different security con-
ditions for attackers. In particular, we analyse IoT robustness against
attacks performed under two threat models, namely (i) physical access
of the attacker, (ii) close proximity of the attacker (i.e., RFID and WiFi
ranges). We discuss the results of the tests we performed on different
categories of IoT devices, namely IP cameras, OFo bike locks, RFID-
based smart-locks, and smart-home WiFi routers. The results show that
most of IoT devices do not address basic vulnerabilities, which can be
exploitable under different threat models.
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1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the interconnection of billions of “smart” de-
vices to the Internet, from smart-lights, smart-door locks, smart-air condition-
ers, smart-cameras, to intelligent fridges, and even vehicles. These objects are
typically networked devices that bridge the physical and virtual worlds. The
growth of IoT in recent year is significant, as consumers, businesses, and govern-
ments recognize the benefit of interconnecting these devices together to provide
additional features. By 2020, it is estimated that 24 billion IoT devices will
be installed world-wide [2]. Furthermore, IoT market is set to increase from
$1.9 trillion in 2013 to $7.1 trillion by 2020 [1]. However, many IoT devices
are manufactured with minimal security considerations, which render them an
easily-exploitable target for attackers. As an example, on October 21st of 2016,
the Mirai IoT botnet [16,17], a network composed by hundred of thousands of
IoT devices controlled by an attacker, launched a distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attack against DYN, a major DNS provider. The attack generated 1.2
terabits of malicious traffic forcing DYN off the Internet for hours. This bot-
net was largely formed by vulnerable IP cameras, digital video recorders, and
routers. Some months later, an allegedly white hacker, named Janit0r, claims
to have “bricked” more than 2 million IoT devices since January 2017 in an
attempt to “protect” the devices before they could be enslaved by Mirai [4] [3].
While the initial motivations of this attack (called Brickerbot) were to “teach” a
lesson to the IoT industry to improve the security of IoT devices, it has actually
achieved to permanently create a DoS on these devices. All of these attacks are
just some examples of the security risks faced by current IoT devices, which are
mainly due to a lack of proper security testing by several IoT manufacturers.
The goal of this paper is to analyse the attack surface of some notable categories
of IoT devices to understand their resiliency under different attack scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we will review some
notables related works on IoT attacks. In Sect. 3, we examine the security of some
representative classes of IoT devices and describe some possible attacks under
two threat models: physical attack and proximity attack. Section 4 reports the
details of our attacks under these threat models, which show that IoT devices
contains vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited using different attackers’
capabilities. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related Works
In [11], the authors have analysed the security of Samsung’s SmartThings plat-
form and found several security vulnerabilities. Similarly, Eyal Ronen and Adi
Shamir [19] have performed functionality extension attacks on IoT devices using
smart-lights as a covert LIFI communication system to exfiltrate data from a
highly secure office building. The authors were able to read the leaked data from
a distance of over 100 meters using cheap equipment. The authors of [18] have
designed a feature-distributed malware to perform various malicious activities,
such as unlocking smart-locks and disarming security alarms. These results show
that traditional web attack techniques, such as cookie stealing, can be turned
into sophisticated attacks on IoT devices. Similarly, the authors of [13] examine
the security of five commercial home smart-locks, and show that most of these
devices suffer from poor design and implementation choices. In addition, the
authors of [21] use an existing Apple app (called Loki), which is a survey app
that integrates the authors’ malware and approved by Apple Store, to infiltrate
home networks. The results show that home routers are poorly protected against
some attacks. Bertino et al. analyse the IoT vulnerabilities [9] from insecure
web/mobile/cloud interface, insufficient authentication/authorization, insecure
network services, lack of transport encryption/integrity verification, privacy con-
cerns, insufficient security configurability, insecure software/firmware, and poor
physical security. However, none of these papers has analysed the risk of IoT
vulnerabilities by including a detailed threat model, which instead is a required
condition (i) to understand the privileges needed by an attacker to perform an
attack [20], (ii) to enable manufacturers to address security methodically by
using different security assumptions. This is the main goal of this paper.
3 Physical and Proximity Attacks for IoT
We describe two existing main threat models, which should be considered when
designing and testing IoT devices for security. To illustrate these threat models,
we will refer to Device-Cloud-Mobile (DCM) model shown in Figure 1, as it is
widely used today in commercial products. Here, the IoT devices (IP camera,
smart-lock, and bike lock) need to connect to the back-end Cloud system, and
support services by an user app running on mobile devices. In some case, the app
connects directly with the IoT device using the device Wi-Fi hotspot capabilities,
which either processes the requests directly or bridges it to the Cloud backend.
We will refer to the legitimate owner of IoT devices as “Alice”, and we will user
the generic term “attacker” to refer to a generic attacker.
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Fig. 1. Device-Cloud-Mobile IoT Architectural Model
Physical Attack. In this threat model, an attacker can physically interact with
the IoT device without notification to Alice. For example, the attacker can access
the hardware, and read and modify the default IoT device’s settings, which may
impact the privacy and authentication credentials of Alice. An example of such
attacks is when an IoT device is left unattended for short or long period of time,
or when it is publicly available (e.g., a sensor in an open field), which enables
an attacker to achieve unguarded access to it.
Proximity Attack. Several IoT devices use wireless communication technology,
such as Bluetooth, infrared, ZigBee, and RFID to communicate data to a central
station or with other devices (e.g., a smart-phone or another node). Therefore,
many of theses communications, if not properly protected, might be available
for listening or modification in proximity areas. In this attack, an attacker can
observe Alice’s interactions with the IoT devices and can also interact with
them by injecting data into the available channel. However, this type of attacker
does not possess an authorized device and cannot physically alter its setting or
firmware. For example, through the analysis of the wireless communication, an
attacker can perform replay or clone attacks. In addition, several WiFi-based
IoT devices can become a client of a botnet [9] because of their vulnerable OS,
such as a vulnerable BusyBox-based Linux distribution (the preferred target
of several IoT botnets). Therefore, the WiFi-based IoT device can be used to
hide the botnet software, which may be exploited to remotely control the IoT
device. This type of attacker does not possess the authorized device and cannot
physically alter it. The two classes of adversaries are also shown in Fig. 1.
4 Performing Physical and Proximity Attacks on IoT
In the following, we describe eight attacks we have analysed and tested under
the previous threat models. In detail, they are: physical attacks for IP camera
and OFo bike lock, proximity attacks for RFID-based smart-locks, and proximity
attacks for WiFi routers in smart-home environment. Table 1 details each IoT
device we studied, their architecture, the analysed threat model and the attack
we have performed.
Table 1. Details of the Tested IoT devices
Type of devices Device Architecture Threat Model Attacks
IP Camera 360 Camera DCM Physical Attack
Default Login
Reset password
Smart Lock OFo Bike Lock
No Direct
Internet Connection
Physical Attack
Default Login
Reset Password
Malicious QR Code
Smart Lock RFID Lock DCM Proximity Attack
Tag Emulation
Tag Cloning
WiFi Router Fast FW150RM DCM Proximity Attack De-authentication
4.1 Physical Attacks: Attacks on IP Webcams and OFo bikes
In this section, we describe the analysis of some commercial webcams against
physical attacks. In particular, we describe how default login settings of IoT
devices and the mobile phone number may be used by the attackers to access
the device illicitly, or to reset the password. Note that these attacks also work
on similar classes of IoT devices, such as OFo bikes app [5,7]. Here, we report
the results of the analysis of the Qihoo 360 camera4 (360Camera), which is
4 http://jia.360.cn/
designed by Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd. in China. This camera is Qihoo’s
premier security camera, and includes several home security options, and is con-
trolled by a mobile app. The camera offers real-time live streaming, including
video recording. Text alerts can be set up when the camera detects movements,
whereas the “Homewatch” function can send alerts to user’s phone when the
camera detects movements in a specific “anti-theft area” so the user is alerted,
for instance, when doors and windows might be unprotected. Regarding its se-
curity, the camera app uses the mobile phone number as the username: hence,
if the owner forgets the password, she can reset the password by requesting it
on the website, and the mobile will receive a PIN so that the user is granted the
right to reset the password. Note that the 360Camera app can support sharing
the real-time and history videos with family people and other friends, which is
a privacy-sensitive feature.
Initial Settings. The 360Camera mobile app is essential for camera setup and
operation. This app is available for Android from Google Play, or for iOS from
the Apple Store, which makes the whole process very easy and trusted for users.
After the installation of this app on user’s smartphone, the user uses the phone
number as the username and sets a password for connecting to the web camera.
The user sets the login process as default settings, so that it does not need to
input the password and username again in the future.
Default Login Attack. In an example scenario, Alice loses her mobile phone or
this has been left unattended for some time. The attacker’s goal is to access the
phone for a short amount of time to be able to modify the camera app setting
to spy on Alice’s privacy through the cam. In this scenario, after the attacker
gets the mobile phone, he/she can login to the 360Camera app and share the
camera’s feeds with anyone he/she chooses. Note that this attack works only if
the phone is unlocked, otherwise, as described in the “Reset Password Attack”
(in the following), the attacker can remove the SIM card, insert it briefly into
another phone to perform the reset password attack. Figure 2 shows the default
login attack of 360Camera. The feed function is given by the Camera, as shown
in Figure 2 titled “Invite Family to View”. If the feeds have been shared with
others, there is a list shown as “1 invited”, where the number “181*****586” is
the phone number of the attacker. In addition, the camera can be set as a public
camera, so that everyone in the list can see the video.
Reset Password Attack. If the mobile phone is lost or the attacker gets it (as
described in the previous attack), the attacker can remove the SIM card and
insert it into his or her phone5. Since the number of the SIM card can be easily
obtained by dialling another number, this allows the attacker to get the web
camera’s username, and he/she can obtain the PIN for resetting the password
through the online reset password function. Then, the attacker obtains the ac-
cess rights to access the camera’s feed, and the attacker might even share it with
5 We assume the SIM card is not locked, as over %60 people do not use the SIM lock
functionality to restrict removing the SIM to another phone [15].
Fig. 2. Owner’s APP: Default Login and Inviting Others to Access the Camera
others. In the tested environment, we have found that even if the legitimate
owner has changed the login password, the shared users can still login to and
get the real-time video of camera. In addition, the owner’s app does not receive
any notification that there is an app running in a third-party smartphone (that
has been granted the sharing rights) that is accessing the camera. All the at-
tacks on 360Camera have been reported to manufacturer, which believes there
is little security risk while the phone number is used as a username to login the
app. However, the manufacturer has produced an updated version that clearly
displays the sharing function to the owner through a dynamic tab at the top
left corner of app to show who has been granted access to the video feeds. The
manufacturer is also considering the possibility of asking the owner to re-grant
the same privileges to users when the password is reset.
We also have performed similar attacks on OFo bikes (China’s “Uber for
bikes”)6, similar to the one discussed previously on the 360Camera. In particular,
if the mobile phone is lost or the attacker gets it, and if the phone has no default
login setting, the attacker can remove the SIM card and insert it into his or her
phone. When the attacker logs in to the OFo app, he/she can login successful
if the phone is configured with the default login and gets the unlock code for
entering the bike number. In addition, the attacker can re-obtain the verification
code by using the phone number. To this end, OFo includes a QR code on the
plate to allow users to retrieve the bike’s number by scanning the code with a
smartphone. However, an attacker can create a fake QR Code for this bike, and
stick on top of the real QR code. Then, the user that will scan this QR Code
with their mobiles phones will be redirected to a fake website that may request
downloading a trojanized app that is similar to OFo app. Figure 3 shows this
attack: here, we can see that an attacker can stick a transparent QR code to
6 http://www.ofo.so/
replace the bike’s QR code, and when the user scans the code she will download
a fake app update, which gives an attacker remote access to it [21].
Fig. 3. Malicious QR Code Attack
4.2 Proximity Attacks: Attacks on RFID-based Smart Lock
RFID devices are widely used in smart-lock systems for security protection, and
also because they are very convenient for users. When someone loses the RFID
key, he/she just needs to elect a new RFID tags as the new key. RFID can also
support access control very easily. However, RFID tags used in these systems
are often vulnerable to various attacks, such as clone and relay attacks. Many
researches have showed generic attacks for RFID systems, but little practical
attacks for actual smart-lock system have been performed so far. In this section,
our focus will be on attacks for gaining access to a restricted area by either
cloning or emulating an access RFID tag. We will describe the following practical
attacks on RFID smart-lock system: tag emulating, and tag cloning.
Tag Emulation. Because many RFID systems lack some security considerations,
the default keys for each sector of tag often do not change, which can be used
to get all of the data of the tag. Here, we describe how a default key attack
is performed, and how all the tag data can be obtained. In this scenario, the
tag can be emulated by a device that presents itself as a tag to the reader.
A tag emulating device is implemented and can be bought online [8]. In our
experiments, we have used the ACR 122U reader together with LIBNFC tools
to emulate a tag. LIBNFC [23] is an open-source C library implementation for
Near Field Communication (NFC) devices providing NFC Software Development
Kit and Programmable API that can be used by RFID and NFC applications.
Some of the important features of this library are: support for ISO 14443-A/B
modulation, MIFARE Classic and Sony Felica protocol implementation, and
ability to transform an USB-based NFC hardware device into a reader or tag.
When the tag is emulated, we can use the ACR 122U reader to unlock the
smart-lock.
Tag Cloning. The tag data can be maliciously read by some devices, such as
PN532 [10] or ACR 122 [14] and Proxmark III [12], and dumped into a file.
Then, the content of this dump file can be revised according to specific access
requirements and could be written to a writeable UID tag. In detail, Proxmak III
is used to sniff the communication information between the tag and the reader,
and can produce the tag content to a dump file. ACR 122U reader can use
specific software to write the dump file to a writeable tag. Then the cloned tag
has the same information as the legal tag. An attacker can then use this cloned
tag to unlock the smart-lock.
4.3 Proximity Attack: Attack on Smart-Home WiFi router
Currently, several WiFi devices are used in smart-home environments and they
need to connect to a WiFi router to access the Internet. In this section, we
discuss how de-authentication (deauth) attack [6] for WiFi router can be used to
disconnect smart-home IoT devices from the Internet. The 802.11 WiFi protocol
contains deauthentication frame which is used to disconnect clients from a WiFi
network. Attackers can send a deauthentication packet to the WiFi transmitter
station at any time using the spoofed source address of the wireless AP. The
attacker does not need to know the password to get into the WiFi network,
as he/she needs just to be in the WiFi signal range. For this attack, we have
used a Pocket 8266 NodeMCU, which is an open source hardware that can be
revised as an attack device. The attack can be extended to external networks
by using an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) [22] to perform the attack when
the attacker is out of the WiFi local network. Fig. 4 depicts the steps of this
attack. In detail, a mobile phone (Phone 2) is connected to NodeMCU, which we
call a proxy-attack-device. Then, the UAV first brings this device into the WiFi
area and then it leaves the WiFi area, so that the proxy-attack-device is left
in the WiFi area. Note that the mobile phone (Phone 2) gives power supply to
Node MCU, and the Node MCU is controlled by another (remote) mobile phone
(Phone 1) via Phone 2. The attack is now performed by the proxy-attack-device
controlled by Phone 1.
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Fig. 4. WiFi Attack
The steps to perform the attack are described in the following:
Initial Settings and Attack. In the experiment, the WiFi device (Fast FW150RM7)
is configured to use the default settings of the manufacturer. Note that all the
smart-home IoT devices are connected to this router. Then, the next steps are:
(i) UAV brings the attack device, which includes a mobile phone (Phone 2) con-
nected to Pocket 8266 NodeMCU, to the target WiFi network. The attacker uses
another mobile phone (Phone 1) browser to connect to a web server running in
NodeMCU. Therefore, the attacker can use it to control Pocket 8266 NodeMCU
to attack the WiFi devices (see Fig. 5); (ii) the attacker scans the available
WiFi hotspots, as shown in Fig. 5; he/she selects one WiFi hotspot, and then
it scans which IoT devices are connected to the WiFi hotpot (Fig. 5 shows that
five clients were found in this range during our experiments); finally, (iii) the
attacker selects one client to start the attack, which is shown in Fig. 5. Then,
the selected device is disconnected from the WiFi after it has been attacked.
Fig. 5. Attack on Smart-Home WiFi Router
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the security of commodity IoT devices by per-
forming physical and proximity attacks. The attack scenarios and experimental
results show that IoT devices attacks are practical and may seriously impact the
safety and privacy of users. In our analyses, we have seen that many commodity
7 http://www.fastcom.com.cn/
IoT devices do not address basic vulnerabilities under different attackers capa-
bilities. In detail, we have found that IP cameras may expose private feeds to
third parties, smart-locks can be easily opened, and smart-home WiFi routers
may be exploited in WiFi range, and in extended range with the help of UAVs.
Many of the attacks presented in this paper highlight the need to improve the
usability of IoT applications in order to improve their security. These attacks
also clearly demonstrate that manufactures should design IoT security carefully
by consider different threat models, such as physical and proximity attacks.
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